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David
F. Answering Gilligan’s Call Had it not been for Annette C. Baier, it might have been some time before I ever encountered so convincing a psychological study based on the probable epistemological differences between the sexes as referenced in her essay, “The Need for More than Justice.” My attitude, at the outset, toward the possibility of such differences, though far from skeptical, had not been solidified into an arguable standpoint due to a lack of exposure to materials concerning the issue. But as of late, and upon further reading, I have become a staunch supporter of the likelihood of such differences and the potential role these differences might play in our relationships with one another as well as the greater functioning of society. But
I do not accredit Baier with the defining of my stance. On the contrary,
this shift in my perception must be properly attributed to the concept’s
creator, psychologist Carol Gilligan. For it was only after reading her
book, In A Different Voice, that I came to appreciate the validity
of the argument favoring the possibility of such differences, via the
acceptance of two very important conclusions related to her research: 1)
that women, in their majority, do indeed exhibit observable and
interpretable cognitive differences which may define a distinct and
entirely gender-specific, or sex-specific difference in their perception
of morality; and 2) that these differences may be related to gender-specific, or sex-specific physiological
features endowed naturally to both as an integral characteristic of either
sex. But what’s more, I’ve also come to realize that because of such
differences (as Gilligan had also realized in her call for a
“marriage” between the two moral perspectives) a new definition of
moral maturity and the process by which moral discernment is passed must
be provided if we are to move forward with our evolution as a people of
sex and sexual psychological distinction (qtd. in Baier 46). I feel that the best way to answer Gilligan’s call is to start from the beginning, introducing her theory (in short) to provide a base of context from which concepts can either be changed or added to create a fuller picture of the realities involved. I will then evaluate her theory from two important positions: 1) that the foundation of her theory need not be the fear-based system she describes; and 2) that comparing her moral developmental theory of women with that of Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, in order to show how the prevailing concept of moral maturity falls short of its gender-mutual goal, was truly one step away from answering the call herself. Although my hypotheses will lack the experimental support it needs to become theory, it is my reasonable belief that supplementing Gilligan’s fear-based system with an evolutionary adaptive strategy provides a stronger framework for the understanding of the moral development of both genders. Also, by adjusting Kohlberg’s theory to assimilate Gilligan’s work, it is my second conclusion that a more perfect understanding of moral development can be achieved, because it combines both gender perspectives into one while simultaneously maintaining their distinction, thus, providing the license for the very marriage Gilligan seeks. As
far as I can ascertain, Gilligan believes that there are two distinct
differences in the way men and women mature cognitively. These differences
allow for entirely diametric dispositions of moral discernment as well as
self-perception. Regarding the masculine perspective, men possess a sense
of self that is egocentrically defined and self-affirming, giving way to a
moral attitude that identifies and appreciates a similarly defined, or at
least the possibility for a similarly defined sense of self in others.
This attitude developed out of what Gilligan describes as an “evil”
experienced in early childhood of either “powerlessness,” or
“weakness,” which ultimately matures into the “justice
perspective,” embodying the virtues of “autonomy,” equality, and
“fairness” –independence– from the seeds of “separation” and
“detachment” (Baier 41). Regarding
the feminine perspective, women possess a sense of self that is diffused
into their relationships and seemingly undeveloped in the conventional
sense. Women evaluate themselves in worth based upon the number of
“affiliations” they maintain and the “equity” that is built up
within those relationships (Gilligan 164). It is from this perspective
that women develop a moral sense and discernment embodied by Gilligan’s
“care perspective,” which entails a strong emphasis on personal
responsibility for others, communication, and interconnection –hence,
interdependence (Baier 41). This perspective is also based upon an evil,
the evil of “isolation,” which gives way to an unconscious demand for
inclusion into the wider community, promoting a sense of self that is
defined by “attachment” and the giving, or “sacrificing” of
oneself for the favor of others throughout early childhood into
adolescence ( Baier 41; Gilligan 156). Eventually, this disposition develops from a quest
for favor to a quest for the mutual good and avoidance of “hurt” for
all involved (Gilligan 73). But
why, pertaining to my first position of evaluation, should this system be
fear-based? It is my belief that a fear-based system of moral development
is far too subjective to offer the kind of observable stability one needs
in order to determine the causal com-ponents of either disposition.
Gilligan offers only a narrow evolutionary possibility for the existence
of such cognitive differences, briefly eluding to the likelihood that such
differences may be the result of the woman’s early role as primary
care-giver (Baier 41). But beyond that, she ventures no further, denoting
an emphasis on the subjective quality of the modern mind while
superimposing its reality as a static descending throughout the whole of
human existence. Quite simply, without an evolutionary counterweight to
offset the lopsidedness of her argument, the concept of gender-specific,
or sex-specific episte-mological variance is sure to topple. Using
Nature vs. Nurture as a kind of scaffolding, we can develop a second
side to Gilligan’s argument –an objective as well as a subjective,
equally explored and balanced against one another– widening the
possibility of discerning the causal realities of epistemological
differences as they become manifest in thought and behavior. Without the
development of an in-depth evolutionary perspective, even though Guilligan
effec-tively denounces the Freudian slant (with its emphasis on causal
relationships based on sexual norms, conflict, and conflict deviation),
she will nevertheless have to rely upon similar subjectively-based
hypotheses in order to substantiate her claims. But more im-portantly,
this would also mean that epistemological differences could never remain
con-sistently gender-specific, or sex-specific, because sociocultural
environmental factors, not inherence, would be their root. It must be
remembered that social conditioning, alone, can never determine an
individual’s sexual, psychological, or epistemological orientation
simply because it is too contextual and too dependent upon cultural norms,
which are never consistent. Plus, according to new research on brain
differences between the sexes, there is now a
significant amount of evidence to suggest that a secondary
physiological component, other than superficial anatomy, exists. There
absolutely must be some kind of natural reason behind these differences outside of Gilligan’s
nurtured one. If we can accept that an evolutionary component of some kind might exist, then it is worth investigating; and brain differences between the sexes may be the key. In a psychological study conducted by Sandra Witelson at McMasters University, she and her fellow researchers found that “in a part of the temporal lobe associated with language skills, women’s brains contained up to 11 [sic] percent more brain cells than men’s brains” (Nichols 1). A similar study conducted at UCLA found that “parts of the corpus callosum [a sub-organ of the brain that provides communication between the two hemispheres] were up to 23 [sic] percent wider in women than in men” (Gorman 6). While still another study conducted by prominent neuropsychologist, George Ojemann, at the University of Seattle found that, when it comes to brain organization, women’s word-definition skills seemed to be more diffusely appropriated throughout the “whole brain,” whereas processes related to speech appeared to be restricted and more localized in the left hemisphere –similar in the latter but very different in the former in comparison to its male counterpart (Kimura 5). Other
differences, such as “cortical thickness” and structural variations in
the inner-brain (namely the hypothalamus), are currently
being investigated for their potential role, as well, in providing further
distinction between the sexes (Kimura 7). But what is interesting is that
if these physical differences
can be reasonably associated to Gilligan’s cognitive
differences, and these differences are rooted gender-specific, or
sex-specific in their physiology, then the differences described by all
must be genetically based. As
Leda Cosmides, an evolutionary psychologist at the University of
California in Santa Barbara, points out, “I have all the genes for being
male except this one, and my husband has all the genes for being female.
The only difference is which genes got turned on” (qtd. in Gorman 4). It
appears that the most basic of sexual differences between men and women
depend primarily upon whether one receives a double-dose of “X”
chromosome or a combination of “X” and “Y” (Gorman 4). And
interestingly, if, as Cosmide contends, these physical differences are in
fact genetically based, then that’s where the evolutionary component may
be found. But what’s even more interesting than that, the reality that
such differences do exist is also leading scientists to conclude that
“men and women probably have been evolving different advantages for a
wide range of activities for at least hundreds of thousands of years”
(Kimura 8). Yet
hundreds of thousands years may not provide the kind of timeframe the most
current of all current findings do suggest are necessary for the
development of “apes” like us. New archeological evidence like Eomaia
scansoria or “dawn mother,” a 125 million year-old fossil find,
offering widely accepted evidence of placental reproductive capacities
some 50 million years earlier than conventional wisdom had previously allowed, has paleontologists wondering just how far
back our own species’ maternal heritage extends (Gore 5). If we consider
the two most important aspects of human sexual distinction –chromosomes
and hormones– it is easy to see why: Both have been with us, well, since
the very beginning. Follow the length of human evolution back some 250
million years to what is believed to be near the start of our mammalian
lineage, and you crash head-long into the Jurassic period, a period more
commonly associated with enormous reptiles like Triceratops and
Tyrannosaurus Rex, not tiny Sinoconodon, a fury rodent-like creature
connected to our modern selves by its mammalian pelt and the adaptation of
an equally distinctive mammalian jaw hinge (Gore 12). “Over time,
changes in jaw mechanics, teeth, brain size, and reproduction moved
mammals down the road to humans” (qtd. in Gore 13). But it is
geneticists like Mark Springer and his colleagues that create the
empirical paper trial, allowing us to follow that road back. “Molecular
biologists read the sequences of an animal’s DNA like an evolutionary
history book” (Gore 22). And it is a story they just cannot get enough
of. But before moving on, such a perspective must be brought into a kind of appli-cable context if it is to survive scrutiny. That application, given the discussion being one based on the evolution of, quite frankly, the human perception of self in moral consideration of that self as well one another, must include how it is that we came to be who we are today, observing ourselves not as we live now, but as we may have lived some 10 or 12 million years earlier. The best place to look for such a connection like that is in Tanzania’s Gombe National Park. In National Geographic’s April 2003 issue, “The Rise of Mammals: Mothers of Us All,” Jane Goodall sits quietly observing our closest genetic relatives, the chimpanzee. Because chimps are so closely related to humans, it is not surprising that they possess some of the more conventional aspects of human distinction. They provide us with a glimpse into ourselves, acting as a living benchmark, the nearest to the final step in our own mammalian progression toward modernity (Goodall 78). As Goodall, herself, writes, “what were once thought to be peaceful, simple vegetarians turned out to be powerful, highly intelligent hunters with complex personalities and emotions: beings capable of communication, altruism, political alliances, infanticide, warfare, and tool making –the last once thought to distinguish humans from the rest of the animal kingdom,” she effectively exposes the likeness between us, holding up the proverbial mirror in front of all (78). In the previous reference to the sequencing of DNA, and its providing a kind of road map to the delineation of our very natural evolutionary arrival on this planet, Goodall’s socio-emotional interpretation of beastly chimpanzee behaviors seems to add a whole new dimension to that mirror of human reflection. Hormonal elements, which are more subject to immediate sociocultural and environmental influences than are genetic endowments (which take hundreds of thousands if not millions of years to manifest their physical realities) are the base consideration for most subjective phenomena –emotional states of mind, personality, intelligence, attributes like kindness, altruism, compassion, moral discernment– far beyond that of their role in sexual distinction alone. Though as Gilligan points out, both elements remain irreconcilably intertwined in their gender-specific, or sex-specific epistemological knotting. But the idea that epistemological differences may have more to do with genetics and hormones, than difficult to assess subjective psychological intangibilities, opens the door to a world of possibilities that is far less complex, in need of interpretation, and natural in its disposition. It is in the more primitive societies of Man that we can observe the most evolved manifestations of human thought and behavior, as it pertains to gender-specific, or sex-specific epistemological distinction. It is widely accepted that because of the difference in reproductive roles held by either sex, men were free to evolve the necessary physical prowess and mental capacities that enabled them to hunt, fight, and provide shelter and safety for family and young. On the other hand, similarly because of the difference in reproductive roles held by either sex, women were free to evolve the necessary physical prowess and mental capacities that enabled them to hunt, fight, and provide safety and shelter for family and young. The only real difference between the two evolutions is the context in which “hunt, fight, and provide shelter and safety for family and young” became manifest. Quite simply, men hunted food out in the open, spread out to cover the most distance for a prey on the move, while women hunted in the undergrowth, in close proximity to one another for a prey that thrived beneath their feet. Men fought against threats that matched their distinct hunting style and environment. Women fought against threat in like measure, comparable to their distinct hunting style and environment. Men provided shelter and safety by building huts. Women provided shelter and safety by building homes. But neither was free independently from one another. Both sexes contributed to the mutual good of the other in their own distinct way. So is it any stretch of the imagination, when provided with a clear evolutionary perspective, how such differences as brain matter and structure can lead to epistemological differences when they are viewed as merely part of our progressing evolutionary identity? Let us quietly look out through Goodall’s eyes to see what it is, pertaining to the base of our sexual roles and their natural epistemological concomitants, about ourselves that can be seen. She observes: [Protowoman] Fifi, the only surviving chimpanzee I knew as an infant in the early 1960s, delivered her ninth offspring at age 44. Most females don’t raise more than two or three offspring to reproductive maturity, but Fifi has four adult offspring, two healthy adolescents, a juvenile, and now a brand new infant. Her high rank allows her to control a particularly food-rich patch of habitat in the central Kakombe Valley, with contributes to her phenomenal breeding success. All but one of her offspring have survived, including Frodo, the current dominant male. At 121 pounds he is the second largest chimpanzee ever recorded at Gombe –and he rules with an iron fist. (78) [Protoman] SCREAMS OF EXCITEMENT [heads the description of a group of male chimps engaging in what appears to be a hierarchical power struggle after a successful hunt] shatter the stillness of the forest after the capture of a bushbuck fawn, held by Frodo. One of the most surprising discoveries in Gombe was not only that chimps are adept hunters, but that meat is a valuable and relished source of fat and protein. Frodo is by far the most successful hunter, recently catching as many as 20 young colobus monkeys during the three-month dry season from August to October, when most of the hunting occurs. Even if he doesn’t make the kill, Frodo often ends up with the carcass, as was the case [in the illustration]: He snatched the fawn from a young male named Sheldon before knocking him out of the tree. Once the prey is caught, the begging begins. Some researchers have theorized that chimpanzees share meat to establish and maintain alliances. But Ian Gilby, who has studied Frodo’s hunting habits for the past four years, doesn’t think that’s the case here. Rather, Gilby believes the most persistent beggars […] get the meat. ‘The bottom line,’ says Gilby, ‘is that Frodo doesn’t need allies’. (Goodall 85) Sometimes the truth can be so appealing that it often goes unnoticed as the lesson just learned. Pertaining to Goodall and her chimps, Mark Springer and his genetically-based evolutionary map, Witelson and any number of other researchers and their findings pointing to physiological variations between the sexes, as well as Gilligan and her exploration of epistemological differences pertaining; beyond the obvious, it may just be a matter of the proper marshaling of evidence on behalf of such cases provided, in order to draw a more accurate association between that previously left to the limits of a purely subjective causal reality, and the object world that exists all around us. In examining our physical selves to the point of discovering the secrets of our supporting genetic base, we uncover pieces to a puzzle that will one day help us answer the first of philosophy’s three most important fundamental questions –where do we come from? As we investigate our evolutionary past for a connection between that which we understand to be our material selves, and that from which all evidence seems to ensure a heritage and similarly material commonality, we come closer to answering philosophy’s second question –who are we? And in determining our place in this world, the simplicity that backs up such a seemingly complicated reality as a conscious human organism walking around in awe of itself, the universe, and all those who hold such similar capacity to be awed by all the same, we, together, attempt an answer to the third –why are we here? It is my firm belief that in providing this key-hole entry into the possibility of an evolutionary component left almost thoroughly unentertained by Gilligan and her most important practical research assessment, we may also, at the very least, see that there are more options available to those who simply seek to do the unlocking.
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